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JEWISH  COMMUNAL  GOVERNMENT 
IN  SPAIN 
HE She'elotli u T'sZi~woth"~  of  $olomoi1 ibn AdretVof  Barce-  T  lona,  forming almest  excluaivelyn the besis  oi this  essay, 
Cover  ehe whole field of  Jetvish life and thougllt duriiig the tliir- 
teenth century.  They contain not only questions of IZLW  aild cere- 
monies,  biit are devoted also to exegesis, phil~sopliy,~  tlieology  and 
a~trology.~  Sere we find  aiii;lientica iii_Eorma.tion coneerniiig  the 
social and political condition of the Jews in general, nnil more defi- 
nitely of  tlie  Spanisli comrnunities during tlie  tliirteeiitli century. 
It is this latter stibject wllich tl-iis essay intends to ßurvey.  Tlio 
mriter, howevei;  would limit l-iis exposition to tlie two lnost essen- 
tial phases of  communal orgmization-first  to discuss $11e  govern- 
ment an&  its officids, tlieii to determine tlie.scope of  tlie organized 
communal  mit, and the ma.nner in wliicli  its fnnciioiis wero  cx- 
ercised. 
The  political  machinery  of  the  Spanish coinmiinit.ies  of  tliis 
period is alinost as varied  as is natnre itself.  Thcre is no single 
and uniform system of  government in the ''Aljama."  We can dis- 
Tlie follo\viiig editions of  3376: responsa Iiave been iised for tliis essay: 
Vols.  I and I11  ed. Lemberg  (1911)  ;  vol. I1  ed.  Livorno  (1ß57) ; vol.  IV 
Petrilcov  ( 1883) ; vol.  V.  Livorno  ( 1825  ) ; vol.  V1  Jerusalein,  ( 1901)  ; 
vols.  Vlb and VII Warsnw  ( 1808), and  vol.  V111  ( Pseucto-Naclixna~iiiles) 
Zollriev  ( 1705 ) . 
* 1235-1310. 
Occasionsl  referenca  will  also  be  made  tn,  tlie  responsa  of  otlier 
Spznisli autliorities;  viz.  Aslicr b.  Jeliiel;  Judah b.  Asher  (in Iiis Ziol~+on 
Jehzldrt,  ed.  Bcrlin,  2846) ;  Nissim b.  Reuben  ancl  Isaac b. Xli~sliet. 
I,  10. 
T,  148. 
The responaa  in general  procluce  a faitlifiil  and unbinsed  picturo of 
tlie a~t~ual  coilditions of  their time, for tliey were not designeil as n aoiirce- 
book  of Iiistory, but only as a coIlection of  legal deoisions. 
102 cover froni t11e  point ol view of  suffrage7 a  variety of  governmental 
features  ranging from democracy  to tyranny.  Communitiess in 
which tlie people at  large directly choseo their representatives, called 
"*il1~7cdnrni?z,"~~  for a limited term, may  be  said to have formed a 
democracy.ll  This does not, however, irnply thnt tlie average mem- 
ber of  such an organization,  or the "ICahal"  entire, had a greater 
degree of  Iibertyi2 tlian an aristocracy would have voachsafed them. 
All dopencled on tlle stipulations made in tlie "Takkan~th'~  of  the 
Aljama, regarding the extent of  power to be invested in the hands 
of  tlie Miilcdamin ovcr its individiial members. 
Most coinmunities,  however,  definitely autl~orized  their govern- 
ing boarcl  to control  all coiilmunal affairs;  t11e  Miikdarnin  exer- 
cised  snprcins autlloi-ity, udettered by la.ter restrictions,  legal or 
popular.  Thus,  possessiug  absolirte power,  tlley  would  forinulate 
the coininlinal  ordinaiices and interpret all consti$utioiial difficnl- 
ties aiid ainbigui1;ies fand  in &ein.  They coiild institute a inajofls 
ex-cornii-iunica~tion,  ~ppoint  oficers,14 aaud  decide an the acquisition 
ancl sale o:E  public pr~perty."~  Neitl~er  a popiilar majority nor the 
advisory boarrli0 coiild act witliout tlicir a,pl)rovai o+ objecf;  to their 
decisions. 
Otller  aclinini~trations~~.  resembled  aristocracies.  1x1  these  a 
small numbcrl8 secrehly selected the gove~uing  body,  termecl  cither 
c'B'r~iri~n,)'lu  rc~~reselitai;ives,  or  "Zelrenim,J'20 elders.  The ca.ncli- 
T Unlilre  modorii  times,  suffrage  was regwded  as tlie only  mcthod  of 
classification tliroiig1;liout the Middla Ages. 
Tuclels,  Jacca,  Valencia,  Teruel,  ete.  (111,  394,  409,  and resp.  of  Ibn 
Shesliot Nos.  223,  240, 260,  463  and 478). 
nie  ofice of  "Mulrdamen"  was largely elcctive  (cf. 111,  428).  In Sa~a- 
gossa it  mns siibjcct to appointment (cf. 111,  304.). 
l0 "M~l<d~~nc~i'~  ia  ofton referred to zls  "Tube  Xair." 
Alt101  I  government  was  conducted  by  a  few,  tliey  ueitlier 
iisurped tlieir potver,  no,r did tliey  assume sgecial privileges. 
la The opposite was  truo in some Spanish commtinities. 
"  VIII,  268. 
"  V,  126 ; 111,  428,  384, 408 ; VII, 26'8. 
18This power  was entrusted  to them  1iy  tlie  pepple. 
x"'C'd~Xe  T5Co'ezahY'; . "BaY,a;le  Eza11,"  etc. 
E.  g. Barcelona, Saragossa, VaIeiicia, Toledo,  Lerida, %lesen,  etc. 
Eitlier five  01.  Bn retiring officers of  the Board. 
10 TIle term "~erii~i~'j  benrs nmny different connotatjons.  Ik  is npplicd 
to tlie  Moral  and Rsligious  Welfnre  Coinrnittee  of  the Aljalna  (I, 1187, dates themselves generally came from a privileged cla~e.~~  In these 
Aljamas tlie work  of  the government was generally done by high 
~fficials,~~  &ppointed  to office by their predecossors througl~  an elabo- 
rate secret process  of  CO-~ptation.*~  This close official anti aristo- 
cratic atmosphere was nevertheless not insusceptible to the popular 
-  voice.  For though a special caste is Open to prejudice and corrup- 
tion, many devices were provided in advance by the cominnnal regu- 
lations to prevent all personal aggrandizement. 
In the first place  tlle ordinances prevented tlie frieilds of  the 
retiring officer  or his  colleagues  to bring to bear  any outside in- 
fluence during the secret appointment of  new officers.  Biirtl~er,  an 
advisory board known  as  "Y~atzirn''~~  was  added,  withont  whose 
consent the B'rurim  could not a~t.~"  And, Bnally,  tl-ie B'riirim  had 
neither  absolute  nor initiative  powerze of  their  own,  biit  rather 
11,  279) ; to judges  appointed under  royal influence  (cf. 111,  380) ; in Le- 
rida to the Finance Committee  (cf. 111,  330,  386,  ete.) ;  to tlie three sworn 
electors,  aiithorized  by  the  "Kahal"  to  ehoose  the  tax-nssessoi.~  for  tlie 
Aljama  (cf.  111,  3DD), and  to  the  tax-supervisors  themselves  (cf.  V, 
221, 222, etc.) . 
Also called "Rovshe Eakal~lial"  or "Gedole J-Iakahal"  (111, 428 ) . 
=A  minimum tax payment  of  3  d<n?zeros entitled  one  to inembership 
in that class  (IV, 312). 
*The  numher  differed with  the  different  Aljamas,  4,  5  (V,  289)  or 
10 (V, 126). 
=The rnanner  of  their election  is  best  described in the constitiition  of 
Lerida:  "When  the annual term is about to expire,  the olcl  board  shall 
assemble on the day prececling each 'Rosh HayshonohJy  in an enclosed place, 
called  'Ustaga.)  Tliere  eacli  officer  sIla11  appoint  his  siiccessor  for  tlie 
ensuing  yeai;  and  his  appointment  shall  remain  valid  (unless tlie  np- 
pointee be  one who  is disqualified  as witness,  and,  therefore,  cannot  serve 
on the board}, even if  it is against the will of  the fellow-meinbers  of  tlie 
board.  During their stay in the 'Ustaga,'  eacli of  them sIial1 supply him- 
self  mith food on his own expense,  and not communicate with  his  friends 
regarding his selection.  Nor can the old body leave the 'Ustaga'  before tlie 
entire board  is  chosen,  and their names  are announced  in tlie  synagogne 
at scrvices by  the Hazan"  (cf. V,  284;  IV, 312). 
*'This  board  of  "~ounsellors'~  was  also subject  to the Same  system  of 
secret  appointment. 
V, 284. 
"They  did  appoint  officers  and  inspect  tlic  repairs  of  tlie  synagogue 
(111, 431,  438,  443).  They  often  had  the power  over  divorces  in  the 
pommunity  (cf. IV,  257). served as an agency to carry out the will2?  of the  populace.  We are 
told that they Iiad no discretionaiiy power  of  their own,  but were 
totally subservient to the vox popdi uniler speci5czs or unspecified 
legal limitations. 
The  office of  the B'rurim may be said to have had the advantage 
over the office of  the Mukdamin.  They both maintained the con- 
tinuityZ0 of  power,  so  highly  essential  to  a  strong  system  of 
government, and still never failed to command the syrnpathy of  the 
people.  For thcy regarded tlie community as a unit, that exists to 
realize its own best rather than to serve tlie personal  iilterests of 
its officials. 
In addition to these  two  common  forms of  governiiieiit  the 
responsa occasionally refer to coniin~~nitics  that can hardly be  said 
to liave had a definite form of administration.  These inay kie  classi- 
fied under two separate headings. 
A  community wl~ich  had no great body to Eormulate  and carry 
out the will of  the meinbers had really no form of  goverilinent at 
all.  So small an Aljama,  which us~ially  took  action as a whole, 
required iii  all its cominunal nffairs  tlie unanimonsaO  decision 01 
the members present. 
Otl-ier Aljamas tliere were,  in wliich  tlie government was  car- 
ried  out withoiit tl~e  consent of  the ''Kabal,''  by  the will  of  one 
individuala1  witli influence at  the courk, or by powerf~l~~  members of 
the Aljama.  Tliese communities must at some time have been in 
the clutches of  tyranny, for their self-crownecl leaders,  we are told, 
- 
27 Eacti step taken by  the 'cBei.urim7' required  the consenl; of  tbe eiltire 
community  (111,  304). 
28Their  right of  expenditure was limited to two  Sueldos.  Beyoild tliat, 
the  consenf  of  tlie  teil  largest tax-payers,  or of  the  entire  ICahal  was 
reqiiired  (111, 428,  434,  443). 
'Vor each retiring officer chose his own  successor  (I,  967;  IV, 312). 
BQ The objection  of a minority was  also valid (111,  304). 
* (Cf, 11, 279,  280;  V,  245).  Such an  individual had received  royal 
permission to  punish moral and religious ofTenders in the community in any 
way that he saw fit, but disregarded entirely tlie feelings of  tlie communal 
autliorities,  wlio  looked  upon his zealous worlr  with suspicion.  Major ex- 
oommiinication was applied to such tyrants as a warniilg for tlie futurc. 
Later,  liowever,  they  were  forced  to dissolve  %11e  "Hel-enz"  under  threat 
of  royal punislunent. 
Cf.  V,  125, which reads:  "Ten  men agreed to appoint B'rurim  witli- 
nut +hhs  covfien$ of  their colleaguea." liad no regular mcthod  of  getting at tl~e  will of  the people  or of 
being  cliecked  by  their  true representatives.  In one  ca~e,~~  for 
example, the power wielded by  a single Jewisli tyrant was  so enor- 
mous tl~at  the high oficers of  the community were forced to with- 
draw tlieir opposition under the threat of  punisl~rnent,  and to in- 
validate against their own will all previous ex-communications that 
had been pronounced against such tyrants. 
Such was tho varied status of  the commiinal government during 
this period. 
In strilring contrast to tlie  diverse  government  of  the period 
tve meet witli an almost uniform communal magistracy tl~roiighout 
the responsa  of  tlie period, whicli  sliow a sameness iii the oficinl 
positions  and functions.  To give a brief  survey of  bot11  tlie paid 
and wnpaid commiinal officers is the piirpose of  tliis chapter. 
A-UNPAID  OFFIDIALS. 
In addition  to the Mi~kdamin  and the B'rurim  a~id  tlieir  ad- 
visory boards,  we  may also classify under tl~s  general heading the 
special  comnittees of  the  Aljama,  eacli  supreme in its  own  de- 
partrzient. 
1.-GOMBIITT~  ON FINANUE. 
This committee, consisting of  five members,  Irnown in Leridaa4 
as B'r~rim,~~  was chosen from the aristocracy  of  wealth.  It had 
full control of  the communal fund for one year,  being autl~orized 
by the Kahal to borrom money whenever it was necessary to fill iip 
the gaps in tl~e  treasnry.  In  most cases, liowever, it would invest the 
money in business or in interest loans,  using the profits for such 
purposes as tliey saw fit.  But the approval of  the ten greatest tax- 
payers w_as required in case the expense was in excess of two "mara- 
vedis."  . 
aBII,  279; V,  245,  283. 
"  111,  330, 386,  387,  425,  434. 
Unlike  tlie  Bei-urim mentioned  above,  these  officers  were  elected  in 
public  by  the  enttire  community.  In  some  communities,  however,  the 
treasury  was  in the  hnnds  of  officers  cnlled  "Neemanim"  (cf. V,  273; 
111, 411). Typical of  other commuiiities is the description of  tlie manner 
in which  the finance committee of  Lerida exercised its function. 
A colnmittee of  five was appointed and Taler divided into two bodieg 
of  two and three members.  The smaller committee  would invest 
the money in proiltable enterp~ises  and present  an account to the 
larger committee every month,  this being  copied by  one of  them 
and later certified by  all.  At the expir~ttion  of  their year's  term, a 
full report was  given to the community, after which others were 
appointed in their place. 
2.-UOMMITTEE  ON  TAXATION. 
This general b~ard,*~  divided into asse~sors~~  and  c~llectors,~~ 
was chosen directlya8  or by lotse from the privileged dass.  Service 
in it, because  of  the great responsibilities connectecl  with it, was 
made compulsory.  All the secrets of  the Aljama were confided to 
tliem under a special ~ath,~O  md  fnll authoriq was given them by 
the members of  the Aljama to take pledges or excommunicate such 
meinbers as had negle~ted~~  the payrnent of  their assessed taxes. 
We  hear  also  of  the  existente  of  a sub-committee  of  ten, 
which may be considered an adjunct to the committee on taxation. 
These rnen were elected for the purpose of  investigating tlie sworn 
statements of  the individual taxpayer,  and of  piinishing any founii 
guilty of  perjury. 
e  committee  of  syndics  was  chosen  from  the  arigtocracy 
of  ~enlth~~  to represent the Aljama inthe  royal court and to defend 
""Of  either  three members,  as in Valencia,  or of  five  (111, 309, 417). 
"  rrN6emanim"; quoted in sources as  "Govee  Ha-Mas"  (111, 428). 
881n  siicli  communitiee,  three mmbers, Berurim,  cliose  them  directly. 
BoIII,  417.  In  Valencia,  five men were chosen by lots from runong  the 
twenty richest members of  the Aljama.  Those chosen,  bad to acceph office 
even  ngainst  their will  (111,  399). 
'O  After  elcction,  they  had to  talre  a special  oatli  "not  to reveal  the 
secrets  of  tJie  coinmunity."  Tliis  probably  accoiints for  tlie  nnnle,  "NBe- 
manim,"  trustees  of  the  Aljama. 
"Cf.  11, 04;  IV,  270;  111, 321,  398,  400. 
42 ShYIiichei  IIa'lcahal,"  i.  e.  Procuratores Universitatis Judoeoruni  (111, 
402; V,  126). 
"AB  an indirect proof,  we may cite the case where the syndics laid out 
in rtdvance  for the Alj-a  tlie large siim of  6,500  dinneros  (111,  394). its interests before  the king.  The power  of  this board  was  un- 
lilnited to dispense la.rge Sums of  money  among the royal officids, 
when brihes were required to obtain privileges for the cornmunity. 
&.-MORAL  AND  RELICSIOUS  WELFBRE  UOMMITTl3E. 
.Tliis committee,  chosen from the aristocracy of  learninP4 and 
general influence,  was  either  a regu1a.r  office or one chosen under 
the exigenciea of  the moment.  It consisted of  a number of  officers 
ternled "B'rure  A~eroth,''~~  who  were authorized by the Rahal to 
seek out the sinne~s  of  the cornmunity and to prescribe specific pun- 
ishment.  Tl~eir  interest also extended to the preventi~n"~  of  crime. 
In this capacity  tl~ey  would  suggest  corrective  means  to be  dis- 
crrssed  at the  general  meetings  and to be  finally  passed  in  the 
form of  ordinances or CcTakkanoth. 
>?47 
5.--COMIMITTEE:  ON  OOMMUNAL  UHARITIEB. 
This general body was  ilivided into +wo part~,~~  each appointed 
by  the Aljanla for a limited time to manage the income and ex- 
pense of the special fund under its supervision.  Tlie following are  I 
the boards that constituted the larger body. 
a.  The officers who  had been in Charge of  the general fund- 
"Gabbz  Z'daka"40-~ouId  use the %und  for the support of the poor 
and  the  ransom  of  proselytes  and  captives.  Sometimes,  they 
would  also be  "aabbe. Hekdash,"BO controlling the fund used  for 
such  sacred  purposes  as  the participation  in  the fnneral proces- 
sion61 or the burying of  an unknown per~on.~~  Occasionally  they 
- 
**Called, tlierefare,  <'Nichbadei Ea'krthala'  or  "Hashuvei  Ea,'kahalw 
1  187  111,  393). 
"Cf.  I,  1187;  11,  279;  IV,  311. 
4Cf.  Chapter  an  the  "Police System  of  tlle  Aljama"  (1,  650;  1206). 
Cf.  chapter on the "Legislation of  the  AljamaJa (I, 1206;  VII, 244, 
496). 
48V,  283;  111,  291-4; IV,  239. 
4QIII,  291-4;  V,  249;  IJ 1099. 
80111,  291;  IV,  239. 
GIIn  Cervera  and  other  small  communities  where  tliere  was  no  local 
cemetery,  the Aljama  would  pay  those  who  would  follow  the  funeral 
procession  from the Iiouge  of  the  deceased to  the neigliboring  c0mmunit.y. 
C,-"  "Weth  Mitzvah."  - would  supportK3  the Talmud S'orah  and provide tlie  sysagogueK4 
with sacred scrolls out of  the same fund. 
b.  Other ~vorlcers  are lrnown in  our sources as "Gabbae  Ma~on.''~" 
These supervised the special £und out of  which the very poor mem- 
bers  were  rcgularly  provided  with meals. 
The Beth-Din-a  term commonly applied to tlie Jewish coiirt- 
consisted of  tlireeb6  judges, to whom the responsa refei*  as DayanimK7 
or  B'ruri~n.~~  ChosenB0  by  tlie Aljamn  or appointed under  royal 
influen~e,~O  they  rcndered their  juriscliction  in civil,  marital and 
on  emergency in criminal ccases. 
Y.-TED  RABBI 
Among tlie unpaiü officers we lnay also mention t11e  communal 
RabbiYBi  known in general termsc2 as  "Ze1iaz.i  Ha-ir"  or "Talrnid 
Hakam."  I-Ie was to teach tl~e  Talmud,  serve as religj.ous lesder 
680nly  when  tliere  was a Surplus in tIie  treasury  would  tliey  appro- 
priate  any money  for the two last;-i~amed  purposes  (111, 201). 
The synagogue was regariled communal property  (111, 434). 
V,  283. 
60Tlio  rabbi  of  the Aljama was generally  a member  of  the cowt  (IV, 
57, 129). 
111, 390, 418. 
68 These' were  probably  special  judgea  appointed  by  the king,  for tlie 
purpose of  reporting all cases to the government, (111,  384,  385). 
"@"Zichron  Jehudah"  discusses  the method  of  election  in  detail.  The 
members of  the Aljama chose two membors and adhorized them ta  choose 
twelve  otlicr  men.  Eacli  of  tliese twelve  placed  the names  of  16s  three 
candidates on a separate ballot.  Tlie tliree candidates receiving  the larg- 
est nuniber  of  votes  were  authorized to act  as "Dayanim"  in tlie  "Betli- 
Din"  (111,  390,  418). 
wThese protected the royal interests.  In  Lerida, for example, tha judges 
had to inform the government of  all cases of  fines,  so that they may not 
be  lost to  tlie crown  (I,  551; VIII,  245;  111,  384). 
"Rabbis  were not paid regularly before the time of  R.  Simon of  Duran 
(cf. Tashbez, I,  142).  In only very  rare cases  do  we hear  of  rabbis re- 
ceiving  Bupport  of  the Aljama  (cf.  Bosh,  68,  and the Testament  of  R. 
Judah b.  Asher,  ed.  Schechter,  p.  18). 
*I,  390. and also officiate as Daym of  the 3ewish court.  The Rabbi is not, 
however, to be identifieda3 vith the Dayan,  for the latter was occa- 
sionally  appointed by  the government without regard to his rab- 
binical qualifications-in  some cases, the Dayan was not able to read 
pr~perly.~*  The two classes must be sharply marked off,  since the 
status of  the judge,  during the period we  speak of,  was far below 
the ideal ~itandard  of  the rabbi. 
1.-+HE  PUBLIO  NOTARY  OF TH1 ALJAMA. 
Tlie scribes5 appointed by  the community added to his regular 
occupation the registry of  deed~.~~  33e  was  authorized by  a com- 
munal ordinance to sign a docurnent in place of  witnesses who were 
unskilled in miting or had died before they could attach their sig- 
nature.aT  In some  Aljarna~,"~  he would  also have  to record  all 
deeds brought to him in a  special register,  "Pinlras  Iia-S~fer,''~~  so 
that the title to  real estate might be determined even after tlle death 
of  witnesses. 
,%!.-TEE  ~EE"LIA.CIE-ZIBBUR  AND THE  SRAMBIASH. 
The Sh'liach-ZibburrO aad the Shammash were  appointed ~tt  a 
salary to serve the synagogue and the authorities.  The  former acted 
as ~antor,~l  solemnizer of  betrothals and marriage~,~~  and as public 
~rier.~~  Thus in the synagogue on the Sabbath he would annoirnce 
Cf.  I,  179, where tlie Rnsh-Ba speaks of  judges  in oontrast to Rabbis 
(I, 179, 651;  VIII, 246). 
'dThis probably  accounte for the continuous occurrence  of  contempt of 
court cases, which caused many Aljamas to promulgate a special TaJcanah 
against the same. 
"  111, 438 ;  V, 129. 
LeII,  107; 111 1  11, 111; IV,  199. 
QI, 729; 111, 438. 
"E.  g.  Saragossa. 
-Thie  book  of  records  must  have  been adapted  from  the eystem  of 
Christian  alcaldes  (VIII,  65). 
"The  eourco  for  payment  for  that  office varies  with  Ghe  different 
Aljamas.  Some  paid  it.  from  the  "communal  fund,lY  while  others  paid 
it from special sources for that purpose,  cf. III, 381; V,  15; I, 300. 
=Baal Tefillah, often acting also as reader of  the latv  (TV,  418;  V, 283). 
"I,  550; 111, 306, 395; IV,  64, 314; V, 815. the newly-chosen  officers and give publicityrS to wits of  ex-com- 
rnunication and to all ordinances, whether promulgated or dissolved 
by the Aljama.  He might also inform the member~  of  property 
to be  sold during the corning weelr.  The Shammash was  overseer 
of  the synngogue,  messenger7" of  tlie  Aljama,  and summoner  or 
warrant officer of  tl-ie court. 
~.-THE  DARSEIAN  ANJ3  TABBAKR. 
Other salaried officers weye  the Darslian and tlie Tabbakh.  The 
former, appointed by  some communities with an annual stipend of 
a hundred  s~eldos,~~  ~lerved  as  preaclier  or  TBliuudical  lecturer. 
The latter superintended the ritual slaughterT7  of  cattle.  The He- 
brew teache~~~  must also have been a paid officer in every  Aljama, 
tliougll tlie soilrces give no reference to tliis effeet. 
To complete tlie  exposition  01 the  inner organization  of  the 
Spanisll communities wo must deacribe the three departments  of 
commnal governmeilt and tlie mmner of  their exercise.  First, it 
may be necessary to define the general nature of  auch a governrnent 
with regard to the division of  public power. 
The careful reader of  tlie responsa  soon realizes timt the legis- 
. Iative,  executive  and judicial  branches of the cornmunity were not 
strictly separate.78  Their functions rather overlapped one another. 
Thus the community in its legislative capaciiy would exercise much 
judicial power,7D  both making and interpreting the laws.  The au- 
I, 816; 111, 304,  300, 396 ;  V,  222. 
"To  invite the membere  to a communal meeting. 
78Cf.  V,  229,  tlie  only  source  whicli  throwa  some  liglik  on  the statiis 
of  the Hebrew  taacher. 
Te Paid by tlie trusted rnembers of  tJie Aljama  (V, 129, 273. 
Only occasionally would tlie Jews have  to slaugIiter their animals in 
khe  direction of  the crAlkibla,"  tlie  Mohasimedan  abattoir  of  the Aijama 
(of. I, 345,  787).  Steinsclineider, "Polemische  U.  Apolog.  Liter.). 
'@The  fact that  the term  Yi3'rurirn'>  applies to communal  authorities 
and judgeg to tax-supervisors and other officers,  clearly shows the absenae 
of etriot separation. 
'*  Divorce  caaecl  were  decided  by commiinal autliorities  (IV, 257,  308; 
V, 247). thorities,  as  exeeutivee,  would  in some  casessO  act in conjunction 
with tlie judiciary  OS  the rabbi, who formed a part of  tlie judiciary. 
Again, in cases of  ex-communication and fines, the law was promul- 
gated and applied by tlie very same b~dy.~~  And the entire police 
powers2 of  tlie community was in the hands of  tlle very represcnta- 
tives who helped pass the police measures. 
Ne~rertheless,  the government of  the Aljama cannot be striciJy re- 
garded as a  centralized form of  govemment; in purely judicia18%nd 
administrative4 afEairs each branch was supreme in its department. 
Tlie three branches of  the Aljama mxist,  therefore, have constituted 
a  CO-operative  government,  each  department  worlring  in  unison 
witli the otl-iers for the beneflt of  the entire community. 
This chapter purposes to oder a lsrief  study of  these co-opera- 
tive departinents. 
B.-TEIE  LEGISLATIVE DDEPARTMENT  OP THE  ALJAUA. 
Tl~e  strongest  znii most  comprehensive  power  was  tlie  power 
granted to comlnunity by  the kingE6  to malre new  laws or to re- 
pedE6  tlie existing laws for tho welfare of  all tllree powers.  Each 
Aljama coulcl malte its TalcIcanoth bindings7 on the Il;ahalss as soon 
BoIii  cases of  moral religious  breacli  (11, 290;  111,  236, 304,  318; IV, 
257; V,  238, 243;  also  Rosh,  XLIII,  6 ). 
V,  272;  VII,  496; VIII,  245. 
82These  B'rurim  searched for  judges  and punished evil-doers  (11, 290; 
IV, 311; V,  240;  VII,  244,  496). 
In private qttarrels  betwcen  indivicluals. 
B'  Taxation. 
-11,  279,  280;  V,  245; also Reap. of  Ibn Shesliet, No.  399. 
88Tlieoretica11y, the  Kalla1  had  no  rigI1t  to  repeal  tllat  which  had 
been  confirmed  by  oath  and  ex-communication.  Prnct;ice,  however,  de- 
mnnded it in certain eme~gencies  (TTII, 241  ) . 
87Each  ordinance was dra~vn  up in Hebrew or Arabic  (VIb, 196), and 
required  both  the  signature  of  the  witnesses  and  the  promulgation  of 
tlie Hazan. 
LLBTlie  eflects  of  tlie  Takanotli  vctried.  In most  cases,  however,  they 
mere binding for periods from Ave  ta  fifty years (I,  824;  V,  279).  In all 
cases,  snve  those  of  taxation,  the laws  were  binding  upon  local  govern- 
ments only.  In  cnses of taxation, the legislative power of  the larger Aljama 
(e. g. Barcelona) extended over  the entire distlrict,  and all srnaller Aljamas 
lind  to aitjust tlieir  government; in nccordance  witli tliese  la~vs  (111, 441, 
395;  VITI,  241). as they were read by the Chazan in tlie synagoguc,  and any mern- 
ber wllo refnsecl  to  submit to t11c  iiem regiilations was liable to be 
excomniiinica  tc~l.~~  A rep  eal was prslctically impossil~le,  sinco tliis 
req11,ircd  tl-ie  approval  of  tlie  entire  Kalial,  116th  no  disseiiting 
voice. 
Sucli was  the  Porce  of  tlle  co1nm11nd  orclinances.  Tliey  af- 
fected vitally evcry phase OB cornmunnl life, nothing being beyond 
tlie  scope  oP  tlieir  power.  Tlie  community  leg*islated over  the 
mhole  doniain of  Jewisli law,  laying  down  rules  governing  con- 
tracts,"O  real pro13erl;y,"~  inl~eritance,~~  and oiher civil mattem.  So 
in marital Inw it prescribed tlie rules of  rnarrit~ge,~~  divosce,0" and 
Tlie  prcvalent  ciistoin  was to iiisert  tlie  following  in  tke forinula: 
"We proliibit and enforce it by  oatli nnd  cx-communicatio~i  * * * and Re 
who  transgrcsses  sliall be  accilrsed." 
DoTliis  was fiilly  discussed  above  under  tlie  office  of  C'Public Notary." 
Some commuiiities  autliorized  tlie  scribe Co1  sign  the  dociuiient:,  in plnce 
of  witnesaes wlio  weio  eitlier  unskillccl  or who  died  before  tlie  document 
could rercive tlie signxtiire  (T,  729;  111,  438; 11,  111; IV,  109). 
OIIn order  to  pi.otecf;  tlie  proprietor  froin  any  eiicroacli~ncnts  that 
(I, 894;  111,  161,  419;  IV,  15,  142;  V,  150;  VIb,  7,  ctc.)  miglit 
Iater  be  inade  agniiist  liis  accpirerl  property,  tlie  caiitor  oP  the  Aljama 
announced  t,l~e  follo~vinp  in case  of  a  sale:  "bny  claimant  to tlle  par- 
ticulxr  estate ilow  on  sale sfinll  present liis  plea  witl~in  15 or  30  days, 
eitlier  before  tlle  BJrurim or  tlie  Beth-Din  (I, 8804;  111,  431;  V,  150). 
Claims registcred later wer%  void, and (in Lcrida) tbc olaimant was placed 
iuider  a ban,  and fined  100  suclclos,  unlcss  a sdcient reason  for  tlle 
delay was given. 
111 orclcr  to satisfy thc cliilclren  as well  as tl~e  near-relatives of  tlie 
dead,  tlie  communities  of  Caetile  liad  a  Iaw passed  that prohibited  the 
liuaband frorn  inl~eiiting  tlie  "Rctubali"  of  his deceased  wife,  and left it 
entirely in tlie hancls  of  lies faniily (111, 432,  442).  This Taw,  promulgated 
for the welfara of  all, is undoiibtedly clue to tlie infl~~ence  of  the Spanish Iaw. 
On Iii  Mallorca,  tlie betrotlial of  a woman was void,  unless it was  per- 
forined in the proseiice  of  teil mcn,  besides tlie Razan, or with the consent 
af her parent,~  and immediate relatives.  This was a measiire against preva- 
lent, licentiousness  (cf. ICayscrling,  c'Jiiden in Navarra,"  8. 171)  (T, 549- 
551,  1206;  IV,  314). 
@4Divorce  agaiiist a  woman's  will  was  proliibited  in masy Aljamas. 
Tlie  government  puiiislied  it  with  deatll.  Soma  Teft  it  entirely  in  the 
haiids of  the B'rurim  (1, 179,  1237, 894;  IV,  186,  257; V,  272; 711,  496; 
vrn, 245). kindred matters.  It distinginished  tl~e  crimcs punishable by fiiie,06 
ex-comin~nicstion,~"  expulsion,  flagellationYn7  OS  even deatl-iYo8  tak- 
ing acti~e  control of  the police power  vf  the community.  In tlie 
same capacity it made regiilations  concerning morals and religious 
observances,OD  and devised rules for tlle conduct OE general business, 
and the market ~lace.~OO 
Okher matters with whic1-i  the Talrlranoth  clealt were  tlie elec- 
tion of oEcers,lOl repair of  tl-ie synagogue,  city walls,  anti roads.lo2 
They regulated the lives and properky  of  the meinbers;  tliey im- 
posed  taxesloS and prescribed  definite arrangeinents f or their  as- 
sessment and collection. 
Buch  was  tho vast legislative  power  exercised by  the Aljarna. 
Next in iinpoxtance to the legislative power was the autliority 
&arge& with tlie execution of tlle laws OE tlie Rahal and tlle ad- 
ministration of  its income ancl  expense.  Tliis section treats of  the 
police  and taxation systems. 
"The  B'rurim  were authorizod  to exact  a fiiie of  B00  Marnvedis d'oro 
for  any ex-communcation kllat might result in loss of  life  (V,  288,  290; 
VII,  160). 
It was more a preventive tlian a  piiliitive measuse.  It affirmed tnika- 
noth,  prevented  immoral  and  irreligious  acts,  i.  e.  gambling  or  viola- 
tions of  the Sabbatb (111,  321,  399;  IV,  321;  V,  236,  240). 
"'For  frivoloiis  violation  of  an  oath  (I, 180,  866;  IV,  126,  239; 
VIb,  196). 
"Informers  were punislied by  dentli in Castile.  Tliey were  the Cancer 
of  the medimval  Jewisli  communities,  Tor  botfi  Jewish  life and  propesty 
was  endangered  by  tlie  denuncintions  of  these "Malsliinim"  (11,  290;  V, 
240,  287,  290). ' 
"11,  290; 11,  236,  304,  318;  IV, 314-16;  V,  126,  238-43;  VIII, 246-79. 
lMCf. Chapter on "Police  System of  tlie Ajama." 
'"11,  280; 111,  409;  IV,  312;  V,  284. 
'''IIT,  409,  434;  in V,  235,  we  read of  a resolution prohibiting travel 
during soma  seasons  of  the year,  by  way  of  a  certain  road  thnt needed 
repairs. 
'OS  Cf. cliapter on rcAdmiilistratioii  of  Aijamn"  (IIL, 406).  In Xaragosea, 
people were kept from emig~ating,  or miarrying their daughters with dowries 
amay fro'm tomn, until all Aljama taxes have been paid in full (111, 397). 
In  Barcelona  and  otlier  places,  there  existed  a  Takanali  wliicli  required 
any man,  who  claimed  he was overaseessed,  to  pay  the siim  in  full and 1.-POLICE  SYSTEM. 
The inner conditions of  the Spanish eommunities  early  gave 
rise to the development  of  a police systein,  designed  both to pre- 
vent and to punish crime.  Police legislation has already been  dis- 
ciissed;  we may now explain tl-ie act~ial  dispeusation of  justice. 
Among the firat, regulations are those on the comunal roads 
and-markets, and tI~e  restrictions inade against sf;raagerslo4 and 
ne~vcoiners.  T11e  Aljaina woiild  thus control the marlret prices of 
wine and ineat;lo6 also it would attempt tu stanaardize all weighta 
and ineasures, iii  order to protect tlie biiyer  against extortion.lo6a 
Creat zeal  was  also  clisplayed  in guarding the  moral  and re- 
ligious melfarc of  the Aljama,  employing the corrective means of 
ex-coinmi-iniea;ti~n,~~~  fines,  anS flagellation.  We  learn,  for  ex- 
ample,  that the Aljaina of  Jaca attempted -t;o fine  an einployer, 
whose servani; hacl bathed in  the river on tlie eighth day oP  Passover ; 
and that another unnamed  comlniinity  did  zctually  fine and ex- 
cominunicate, for a period,  a mealthy  Jew ~110  had engaged non- 
Jewisli worlrmen  to build his Iiouse on tllc  Sabbatl~. Some com- 
nunities would impose a fine of  five liundreii siieldos on a violator 
of  an oath (cf. I, 179, 894; V,  BY2,  290).  Others, however, would 
apply flagellation wlien an oath was violated in mere frivoliiy, and 
in cases of  disobedience to Che  Eetll-Din nnd  of immorality.  Only 
occasionally,  in matters of  grent  stress and importance,  was  the 
then present his case before tlie Kabel or the Jewish coiirt.  The Rashba 
remarks:  "Otherkise  every  one  would  present  tlie  saue  pIea  and  taxes 
would  never  be  collected."  The  Xahd  at  Saragoase  expreased  itself 
strongly against exemptions granted to influential members,  and prohibited 
under  threat  of  ex-communication  tlie  use  of  suah  privileges  for  fifky 
years,  or more (111, 397; V,  279 ;  31,  290; 111,  385,  388;  IV,  311 ;  V,  164, 
290;  VIII, 240). 
lo4  The  record of  each newconler  was  examined very closely,  and ho  had 
to  &ake an oath before the authoritia of  the tolvn, stating his good inten- 
tions to become  a permanent, resident  of  tlie Aljama  (111,  413;  V,  240). 
lmThe fixing of  mmt prices  in the ccCarniceria" was adjusted by  the 
officers. 
lo5aI, 180;  11, 290; 111,  304,  309;  IV,  315;  V,  238;  VII,  244,  511; 
VIII, 279. 
Io0 There was tIie ban oP  minor excommunica.t;ion, 'Niddui,"  which lasted 
onIy for a  short time;  and (?Xerem,"  major  excommunication,  a complek 
social boycott.  Tlie  king,  as well as t110  Aljama, spplied these  (I, 657; 
XII,  442), Aljama  foi-ced  to sucli  severe  measures  as  expulsion  or  capital 
puni~hment.~~~  As  an  illustration,  we  may  mention  the  apos- 
tates of  Suille, a man and his consort  (another's wife), who came 
to  Toledo  with the intention  of  returning  to  the  Jewisl~  fold. 
The latter Aljaula first ordered tllein lasbed  ancl tlicn sent tl-iem 
off  to different p1a~es.l~~~ 
This then was the siqreme police power wliicli the Spanish com- 
munities alone108 exercised over tl~eir  members by tlie will oi-  tl~e 
king  (111,  285, 20,  388),  and by the flexilsility of  Jewish law.losa 
It was their diity to give all fines to  the royal treasurylOD xnd to let 
the govornment exeeute oflenders convictecl iirider the Jewish law. 
Far more complicaked tban the police system was the adminis- 
tration of  taxes.  Tlle lang dividerl his co~uitry  into tax flistricts, 
permitting the Spanish Jewry to levy a lump sum on each  com- 
munity separately or on several communities  collectively.  Of ten 
the Eahal was forcea to borrow money  from its ricli members  or 
from the neighboring  GentilesXlq  to pay its quota in advance  to 
the roya.1 treasury.  Later, the Aljamn wonld assess each member 
from  fifteen  years  up,  according  to his  property  and  income, 
excepting  generally  the  poor,  the  infliiential,lll  and  the new- 
~omer~~~  in the comm~inity. 
Interesting is the way the supervisors would  assess  and collect 
- 
Ia7The  nmber of  stripes was unlimited.  The offender was lashed with 
a  double-fiarnessed  strap until he  acceptecl  tlie  judpent of  the Rabbis 
(VIII, 466). 
Io7a  I, 551; 11,  200; V,  104,  240,  290. 
loBThe  Rosh  remasks:  "In  none  of  the lands,  save here in Spaiii,  have 
I Iienrd of  Jews krying cases of capitaI punishmentJ' [XVIII, 8  ) . 
losaI, 81; 11,  95; 111,  384,  431;  VIII,  257. 
*<WZn  most cases,  the fines  were  delivered  dircctly  to tfie  government. 
Often  & Jewish collector  would  take them up,  receiving  10%  cornmission. 
=OThey  would  often  ba  taxod  on  interest  received  on  gentile  loans 
(V,  179). 
'''These  would  either be exempted by the king, or by thc Aljama itself 
iii  return  fo'r  public  services.  The Hebrem  royal trcasury was  also im- 
mune (I, 144;  V,  183,  279). 
-Newcomere  were  exempted  from  part taxation,  and  encouraged  in 
many other ways  to remain permanent settlers (111, 404;  V,  179). the taxes.  All tlie uiembers  of  the cominnnity under oath prom- 
isecl to lreep an execl; record  of  tlieir property and incoriie,  and to 
present it oii clemand to tl~e  coinmunal  autliorities.  These wo1114 
col~y  the recorcl in tlleir register-in  Arabic,  CCAlbitkahyJ-and 
then send a cornmittee of  ten to investigate the sworn statements. 
Whcii  tlie  Giial  assessment  was made on this basis,  slll  rnembers, 
undcr fear oP  ex-commrmication,  were orderecl to pay in four in- 
stallrnents,  on the last two  days of  Sivnn, Tamuz,  Ab,  and Elul. 
The  recalcitrants  mere  later  publicly  reminded  on  Monday  and 
Tliursday of  tlie prescribed period of  the ban that tlireatened them 
if tliey  witl~lield  payinent.  Tl-iose who  removed had first to  take 
a ~pecial  oat1i113 and remit all ouktanding d~~es  before lesiving for 
anotlier Aljarna. - 
The assesslne~it  gLWned  nem complexity mhen members had busi- 
ness transactions or proper@ outside of  tlieir own Aljma.  In  such 
nnusual cases,  tlie method varied mitli the differeui; communities. 
Soine followed  tlie old cnstom  "tllat  two communities cannot tax 
tlie sanie property at one time,"  and would  not tax property  out- 
side tlieir  owl Aljama.  Otl~ers  agaia  (V,  178,  263, 283,  286), 
would first malre the membew pay for al1 their possessions,  later 
allowiiig for the tax paid elsewliere.  The Aljamas later attempted 
to confine all the transactions  oP  tlleir meinbers wi-&in their omn 
bounds.  They willingly suffered a loss  [once amounting to 3,300 
sueldos CcJaq~~es"-cCDinare  YalrshiskLJy-]  ili case the taxes which 
tbeir rnembers had to pay  to  other cormnunities overbalanced tlle 
siim paid Iriy  these very members to their own treasusy. 
The varions items of  taxatioa may fall into two general  cate- 
gories-1-egrllar  and irregular.  Tl~e  former mere the definite, sys- 
tematic taxes,  levied periodically uncler  authority of  law  and by 
a  fixed rule of  proportion. 
The regular  taxes are themselves divided irdo  royal and com- 
iniiilal ;  tl-ie Grst vere levied by tlie lring on landz1* or on incorne  ;Ix6  - 
"8Sliis was to msure theiilselves that tlie  departure did not mean an 
evasion  from  taxation. 
114 rcTnsl<a3'  an& "Aril~tnitli";  iii  Lericls  tliis  amounted  to  1%  siieidos 
on each "Piska"  of  100 srzeldos,  and was  Ievied  on landed property  only. 
We find  one  case  wliere  t,here  was  s  specinl tax pnyable  to tlie  clergy 
(I,  788; V,  182,  288). 
ImLovjed oilly  on  persoiial  property,  ancl  debts.  It  often  seached 
50%  (I,  799). tlie latter werc laid by  tlie Aljama on specixl  articles-used  gen- 
erally  for  sncli  purposes  as  the  niglit-gnard  and  the  imepair  of 
city  or synagogue.l1° 
Comm~inal  taxes includecl also tlie ststnding charity func1,ll7 that 
provided  for siicli neecls  as the relief  of  tlie poor  and the release 
of  captives and proselytes,  as well as the special sources of  revenue 
out of  which  the  salaried  oflicinls  mere  paid. 
The irregular  taxes,  generally  raiscd  among  tl~e  inembers  of 
the  Aljama by  special  and extraordinary  taxation,  incliicicd  both 
royal  anti clerical subsidies.  Tlie several cases  eiiumerated belom 
may  serve  as  typical  of  the inany  forced  contributioiis  iinposed 
iipon tlle Jems of  tllat period. 
As for clericnl subsidies, we  are told that a small community 
near Monzoii snffered much froin alsostates, wlio  attempted to per- 
silade the clergy to forbid tlle use  of  bread,  meat a11d  wine  pre- 
pared  accorcling to Jewish ritual.  So preveilt  the disastrous re- 
aults that mould have followed t;liis prohibition,  the Jems were com- 
pelled  to distribute large bribes  among the clergy  aizd  judges  of 
the town. 
In Marseilles, Brance  (111, 389),  tlie Jews wlio had prcsented 
SL  ~urim  play  in  the  neighborliood  of  the bishop  (Hegemon), 
were accused by  tlie latter ol ridiculing Cliristianity.  Only by  ex- 
tensive  bribery  were  they  able  to  silence  tlze  in~ti~tors  of  this 
chnrge. 
Royal  subsidies  mere  also  extortionate.  T%e  communiS  of 
Saragos~ia  had  to  furnish the lcing  5,500  sueldos in orcler  to  be 
granted five letters of  lsrivileges with tlle royal seal.lla 
Reference is also made to an uunanied community that raised 
large sums of money to  influence the kind to rediice the Jew's  badge 
to olle-half its prescribed size.llD  They had to pay well to prevent 
the loss of  all interest on tlieir loails,  conseiiting, however,  to give 
up only the illegal interest taken llrom  Gentiles.120 
llGChm.ge; in some  German  cornmuniäes,  acc.  to R.  Meir,  of  Rothen- 
burg, it amounted to a fixed  aum  oP 60  x'lczr?cim,  prtid  wlierever  sojourned. 
Sorne Al.jamas liad fixecl taxes on all ttrades (I,  788,  1090). 
""Tax on real property  and on ineomes. 
*I8 C'Hotl~motli  Hn'inelecli."  One of  tlie privileges was not to interf ere 
witli tlie rigllt of  tlie Aljama to collect, taxes in its own way  (111,  394,  402). 
The garment ye'Zi?,ta required no badge at all  (I,  644;  V,  183  ) . 
A  previous edict Iiad ordered  tlie Jew who toolr  an excessive amoiriit 
of  interest from n Christia~i  to  lose both interest and capital. The Aljama of  Huesca would usually pay a tribute of  100 sueldos 
on tlie accession  of  each local  ruler.lZ1  In fact,  Spanish Jewry 
as a whole  bad to levy a heavy protection tax on its Aljamas,  to 
sa-feguard tlle life and property of  its members on the eve of  some 
Chris  tiun holiday. 
In Nallorca tlie kingl"  would extort large siims of  inoney from 
lzis  varions Aljamas.  The Jems of  Toledo,  after I-iaving given up 
a heavy war-tax, in adation siiffered a great loss by the royal com- 
pulsory loans, which were never repaid. 
And,  more than  all this,  often tlie  king  accused  people  on 
tsnmped-uplzs charges in order to confiscate their pr~perty.~~~  For 
exaiiiple,  tlie accusation against a  prominent Jew of  Tortosa, that 
he had converted liis ~lohammedan  maid-servant by force, resulted 
in a heavy loss not only to him, biit to tlie Aljama as a whole. 
All tliese diverse tax items the cCtriisted  rnembers"  of  the Aljama 
had to attend to.  It is no monder tliai;  somc communal ordinances 
made this office compulsory, for great and manifold responsihilities 
were connected with the administration of  taxes. 
The last, though not the least important, function of  the Aljama 
is the jiidicial power.  The Dayanim as mcmbers of  tlie Beth-Din, 
Ilaa tlie authority to clecide and pronounce judgment in accordance 
with Jewish lawlZ5  betmeen  private parties or communal factions 
in bot11 marital and civil cases.12"  This right of  tbe Aljama to 
set np an independentlZT  jurisdiction  on the basis  of  Jewish law, 
lal  The nme  of  one  oficer rnentioned  in IV,  404,  is  "Don  Romanus de 
Moncada." 
122 probabIy  King Jaime 11,  in  1306 (  ICayserling,  Jiiden  in Navarra, 
S. 162). 
lZ8~his  was  a comnion  practice througlioiit  tlie  diaspora at tliat time. 
Kings of  France aiid  England woiild  often indulge in it as well  (I, 644; 
111,  380; IV,  139). 
lZ4 Even  belongings  of  Je\-vs who  had mereIy  passed  through  the prov- 
iiice  were  often  confiscated  (cf.  I,  1159;  Graetz,  Gescli.  der  Juden,  B. 
7,  S.  14). 
Where  tlie  Iciilg  recognized tlie Je~visli  sgstom of  Iaxv  and courts. 
lZ0I,  118;  11, 3;  111,  308,  411;  V,  194,  228;  VI,  OG. 
The autonomiy  of  tlie  aljama was  not  iiiterfered  with  by  the king 
for some time (I,  1148; V,  194). was never  interfered with by the kiug or his officials.  It was left 
entirely to the Rahal, aild in some cases was encouraged eitl~er  by 
the Gentile litigantslZ8  or the governinent itselB.I2" 
We are told that the mernbers of  the colnrnllnity moiild  always 
prefer the Beth-Din  to the alcaldes in all cases  of  litigation be- 
tween Zews.  And when one litigant was a Gentile,  soine Aljamas 
even  required that the legal doci~rnents,~~~  at least,  be  drawn up 
in accordance witll the Jewish law.lS1 
The Beth-Din,  howevcr,  was not concerncd witli the adniinis- 
tratioa of  justice alone, b~it  acted also as a  CO-ordinatingl" clepart- 
ment of  the legislative and executive branches oll  t11e  Aljaina.  In 
such a capacity the Chief  Beth-Dinl"  interpreted the cornmiinal or- 
dinaiices,  and acted as a conrt of  appeals mhcn the rne~nbers  01 the 
Aljama would diepute a claim inade agaiiist tlieiii Isy  their "trnsted 
members.Jf The Jewisli. court woiild also act as  advisoiy board of 
the Aljama in case the latter was divided on soilie vital question 
of  the day,  or needed advice on the possibility oQ  repealing certain 
Takkanoth under the stress of  ~ircunistances.~~~ 
Thus, while theoretically wedc, the jiidiciary in  reality siicceeded 
in holding its om  place as a judicial  arid CO-ordinate  clepartment, 
and it retained the balance of  power with nll. its prerogative iinim- 
paired. 
This brief  survey  uf  communal  govermnent in  Spain diiririg 
the thirteenih century will suffice  to  prove  tl-iat the Aljama was 
A C~BO  where a  gentile siiinmoned a Jew  to tlie rabbi's  court (IV,  16). 
l~Occasionally  tue  magistrate  would  sencl  tho  Jelvish  litigarrts  to 
be judged by the Beth-Din, even after tlie case lincl proceeded for some time 
1  1148; I  3).  Only  when  tlie  gentile  was  the defeiiclaiit  do  me  find 
a Jew  in the alcaldes.  Here he  took  an oath of  a special  form before  a 
figure of  a man, wearing a Jewish costiime,  and lioldiilg the Decalogue in 
Hebrew  script. 
laODocuments were  dsn~m  up  eitlier  by 5 Je~vish notaTy, or  in  the 
alcaldes, preferabIe the latter  (I,  729; 11,  07; 111,  00, 19; VIb,  149). 
I"  Only  Jews coiild act as witnesses. 
saaIt  was unable,  howeves,  to enforce its jurisdiction  (111, 41l). 
Ia' E. g. The  coiirt of  Rashba in Barcelona.. 
1"'1,  236;  1x1, 398, 411;  IV,  308; V,  230, 247, 282. esiientially  aa organized  lo~all~~  iinit  amoilg  other  uniix  of  the 
same urind.  Nearly  every  commimity,  as  we have  Seen,  had its 
tllree CO-ope~ative  forces, thc legislative, the executive and the jiidi- 
cial, well organized Bor  the accomplishment of  a lilce aim.  It also 
formed a  society of  its own in whicll  the popi~lar  influence  was 
highly  effective. 
The Aljama of  this peFiocl may,  therefore,  well be regarded  as 
a most  efficient organization, witli a publie conscieaco all its omn. 
Iss Occa~ionally  only  we  meet  witli  a  cenfralized  form  of  government 
11  290;  11  411)  ;  e. g.  tlie ttvo  cases,  tvhere tl~e  Aljamn of  Toledo  ap- 
pointed judges for a smaller coinmmity, arid ~vhc'e  Barcelona passed  new 
ltiws oii taxntion, aITecting Tarracona, Vill~~frnnca,  snd Monblaricli,  as well. 